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EVALUATING STATE LAND USE
CONTROL: PERSPECTIVES AND HAWAII
CASE STUDY
G KEM LO WRY, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A state role in land development control, considered "revolution-
ary" a decade ago, has become commonplace in recent years. At
least thirty-four states exercise some type of regulatory authority over
land development, although the level of state involvement and the
purposes for which state authority is exercised vary widely.' States
have developed or are developing programs to manage flood plains
and wetlands,' designate and regulate development in critical areas,3
site power plants and other regional facilities,4 protect agricultural
land.5 regulate surface mining6 and achieve other goals.
7
The case for a state role in land development control is based on
W Assistant Professor of Urban & Regional Planning, University of Hawaii. B.A.,
Washburn. 1964; Ph.D., University of Hawaii, 1976. The author wishes to acknowlege
comments on previous drafts by Professors Edward Kaiser and David Godschalk,
Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill; Professors Tom Dinell and John Holmstrom, Urban and Regional Planning
Program; and Professor David Callies, School of Law, University of Hawaii.
1. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE GROWTH MANAGEMENT (1976).
2. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-2413 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 3 (1978).
3. Eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05 (West Supp. 1979).
4. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 3 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4906.01-4906.15,
§ 4906.98-4906.99 (Supp. 1978) WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.010-80.50.902 (Supp.
1979).
5, E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.111 (Supp. 1978); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-12,
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several arguments.8 Perhaps the most prominent argument is that the
local structure of land development control is insufficiently sensitive
to the environmental consequences of local land development deci-
sions. Since polluted air and water do not respect jurisdictional
boundaries, extra-local authority is required to minimize the "spill-
over" of adverse environmental impacts from one jurisdiction to an-
other. The Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act,9 the Water
Pollution Prevention and Control Act,' ° and the National Coastal
Zone Management Act' I are prominent examples of federal statutes
which have redistributed regulatory authority to state governments in
order to deal with the regional impact of local land development de-
cisions.
A second argument for a larger state role in land development con-
trol is that particular natural resource units such as coastal wetlands
and prime agricultural lands are statewide resources which are not
adequately managed by local governments. Many states have devel-
oped programs that require state permits for development in environ-
mentally sensitive areas or provide incentives, such as tax breaks, for
the protection of some resource units.' 2 At the federal level, the
Coastal Zone Management Act provides financial incentives to
thirty-four coastal states and territories to develop programs for the
management of coastal resources.'3 One condition of federal ap-
proval of state programs is a state role in the authorization of coastal
development. 14
A third rationale for a state role in land development control is the
fragmentation of land use regulatory authority in many metropolitan
§ 246-12.3 to 246-12.4 (1976); CAL. GOV'T. CODE §§ 51200-51205 (Supp. 1979); CAL.
REV. & TAX CODE §§ 421-429 (Deering Supp. 1977).
6. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 83A.1-83A.31 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-
1540 to 58-1564 (Supp. 1978).
7. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65300 (Deering 1979) (requiring city and county leg-
islative bodies to adopt a comprehensive plan).
8. See generally G. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES (1976); D. MANDELKER,
ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION (1976); N. ROSENBAUM, LAND
USE AND THE LEGISLATORS (1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1979).
10. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
11. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (Supp. 1979).
12. See notes 2, 5 supra.
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. 1979).
14. Id. § 1455.
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areas. This fragmentation of authority, it is argued, contributes to
competition for fiscally preferable industrial and commercial devel-
opment, to exclusionary land use policies, and to a general lack of
attention to regional needs for subsidized housing or major, region-
serving capital facilities. In some metropolitan areas, regional bodies
have been established to provide a broader geographic base for land
development planning and control. 5
The size or the impact of certain public and private facilities has
led some states to require state development permits. While thirty-
four states have power plant siting requirements, 16 a few states go
much further. Vermont, for example, requires state development
permission for subdivisions and developments which are "of greater
than local concern," defined in terms of the number of housing units
involved, the amount of acreage involved or the elevation of the pro-
posed development.' 7 The American Law Institute's Model Land
Development Code also promotes a state role in reviewing regional
facilities with its section on "developments of regional impact or ben-
efit."'"
Finally, some believe that a strong state role in land development
control is preferable to a local monopoly on control because state
authority is less subject to the political forces that surround local city
councils and zoning boards. Critics of locally administered land use
controls argue that land development is an enormously profitable in-
dustry, an industry whose profits go not only to landowners and de-
velopers, but also to contractors, local businessmen, lawyers,
mortgage bankers and a host of others. These critics suggest that the
local administration of land use controls is dominated by such inter-
ests." Ironically, at a time when decentralization of authority is be-
ing touted as a solution to many ills including land use problems,
20
15. The Association of Bay Area Governments, the Twin Cities Metropolitan
Council, and the Washington, D.C. Council of Governments are prominent exam-
ples. Seegeneral/' 2 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
SuB-STATE REGIONALISM AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: REGIONAL GOVERNANCE-
PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (1973).
16. See e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 38, § 3(1978); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4906.01-
4906.15, § 4906.98-4906.99 (Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 80.50.010-80.50.902
(Supp. 1979).
17. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
18 ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 7-301 (1976).
19. See, e.g., L. DOWNIE, MORTGAGE ON AMERICA (1974).
20 For a discussion of this trend, see M. REAGAN, THE NEW FEDERALISM (1972).
1980]
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greater centralization of authority is promoted to reform the existing
structure of land use control.2 1
The distribution of land use regulatory authority is a volatile issue.
For example, while noting the "pervasive feeling that local control
has been a failure,",22 One observer questions whether states or met-
ropolitan areas can do a better job.23 Substantive arguments about
the relative merits of state versus local land use control illustrate the
general problem of determining the "success" or "failure" of any pol-
icy program or series of public actions. Formal policy evaluation
poses formidable conceptual and methodological problems.
Most evaluative generalizations about state land use control rest on
a few impressions and anecdotes gleaned from case studies of partic-
ular programs. Given the disparate purposes for which state land use
control programs are designed, the wide variety of control mecha-
nisms employed, and the different socio-economic and political con-
texts within which programs have been implemented, this is not
surprising. Now, however, there is sufficient experience with state
land use programs to begin to conduct evaluative studies.
This Article will identify five general approaches for evaluating the
effects of a comprehensive state land use control program. The vehi-
cle for this analysis will be the Hawaii land use program. The study
will focus on the implementation of the Hawaii program as opposed
to the conditions that led to its enactment with particular attention to
the development of concepts and analytical approaches from which
hypotheses can be generated and tested comparatively.
II. EVALUATIVE APPROACHES
Presently, studies purporting to be evaluations of state land use or
environmental programs generally fall into five categories: legal as-
sessments, goal achievement studies, administrative capability assess-
ments, cost studies and compliance studies.
21. See generally F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN
LAND USE CONTROL (1971); E. HASKELL & V. PRICE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
AGEMENT: CASE STUDIES OF NINE STATES (1973); R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE
STATES (1976); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLA-
TION (1976).
22. R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES 5 (1976).
23. Id. at 6. See generally R. LINOWES & D. ALLENSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF
LAND USE: PLANNING, ZONING, AND THE PRIVATE DEVELOPER (1973).
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A. Legal Assessments
Perhaps the most prevalent type of "evaluation" is that found in
legal journals. The authors of these studies assess particular state
land use control strategies in terms of their judicial acceptability in
state or federal courts.24 While judicial acceptability is a necessary
condition of program effectiveness, it is not a sufficient one. Never-
theless, legal evaluations are important because they draw attention
to particular issues that may affect program implementation. Such
evaluations help to convey a sense of the boundaries of permissible
regulatory behavior and to draw attention to glaring loopholes and
burdensome aspects of a particular regulatory regime. A broader
evaluative perspective, however, is needed: one that focuses on pat-
terns of regulatory behavior and the distribution of benefits and bur-
dens resulting from that pattern of behavior.
B. Goal Achievement
A second evaluative approach is to focus on the extent to which
state land use programs successfully achieve their statutory objec-
tives." Most of these studies rely on subjective perceptions of effec-
tiveness. While most such studies focus on single cases there are
examples of comparative studies of perceived effectiveness based on
large sample surveys. Because the standards by which effectiveness is
judged frequently are not stated, the inferences drawn from these
studies suffer from problematic validity. Even when specific permit
decisions are discussed, the reader can only speculate how character-
istic the particular case is of the total population of decisions from
which it is drawn. Finally, most of these studies lack an explicit
framework or set of concepts to serve as a basis for comparative anal-
ysis. Nevertheless, the best of these accounts provides rich sources of
descriptive information about the problems of implementing state
land use programs.
A second type of goal achievement study seeks to trace the actual
24. See, e.g., Bosselman, Growth Management and Constitutional Rights-Part I.
The Blessings af Quiet Seclusion, 8 URBAN L. ANN. 3 (1974); Hess, Institutionalizing
the Revolution: Judicial Reaction to State Land Use Laws, 9 URB. LAW. 183 (1977).
25 See, e.g., E. BOSSELMAN AND D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND
USE CONTROL (1976); L. CARTER, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE (1974); E. HASKELL &
V. PRICE, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: CASE STUDIES OF NINE STATES
(1973); R. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES (1970); McCahill, Florida's Not So
Quiet Revolution, 40 PLAN. 10, 10-13 (1974).
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impacts of specific land use programs rather than relying on subjec-
tive perceptions of impacts. To what extent do tax incentive pro-
grams encourage landowners to dedicate land for agriculture or open
space?26 Do coastal zone regulatory programs enhance the aesthetic
quality of the shoreline?27 Analysts seeking to determine how state
land use programs affect the problems they were designed to address
deal with these and other similar questions.
C. Administrative Capabilities
Another mode of evaluation is to focus on a state's administrative
capability to engage in land use control. In one such study, compo-
nents of an "ideal" state planning apparatus were identified and then
states were evaluated with respect to the extent they measured up to
that ideal.28 While this particular study has received criticism re-
garding the appropriateness of the "ideal" system components and
the research methods for rating states,29 other standards and research
methodologies might make this a more useful approach.30 Such an
approach might be particularly useful if variations in types of admin-
istrative structures and administrative resources could be correlated
with variations in patterns of regulatory behavior. This would make
possible inferences about "optimal" administrative conditions for the
implementation of state land use programs.
D. Cost Studies
One of the principal arguments against state land use and environ-
mental control programs is that they impose additional development
costs. Cost, then, is another criterion for evaluating these programs.
Increased development costs occur directly because of additional in-
terest charges the developer must bear since permit processing takes
more time, and because of additional legal, planning or engineering
studies which the new permits may require.31 Indirect costs may in-
26. See J. KEENE, D. BARRY, R. COUGHLIN, J. FERNAM, E. KELLY, T. PLANT &
A. STRONG, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE (1976).
27. See R. DILTON, J. SEYMOOR & G. SWANSON, COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGE-
MENT 147-166 (1977).
28. Catanese, An Evaluation of State Planning, 38 PLANNING 155 (1972).
29. Letter from Jack Thomas to the Editor, 38 PLAN. 219 (October 1972).
30. For a further discussion of the administration of state planning, see COUNCIL
OF STATE PLANNING AGENCIES, STATE PLANNING SERIES (1977).
31. See generally BERGMAN, EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF POLICY RELATED RE-
[Vol, 18:85
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crease if the price of developable land increases in other areas as a
result of new or more stringent controls. While the current evaluative
interest is in the costs of such programs, the costs of not having such
programs also would be an appropriate area of inquiry.
E. Compliance Studies
Compliance studies represent a fifth evaluative approach. Compli-
ance theorists are concerned with the conditions of and propensity
toward obedience.32 Compliance studies have their intellectual ante-
cedents in the psychological and sociological analysis of individual
deviant behavior and in legal philosophy. In the 1960's political
scientists, in particular, became interested in the compliance of insti-
tutions such as police departments and school boards with U.S.
Supreme Court decisions.33 Compliance also is an important concept
in administrative theory.34 In this field, the principal focus is on
compliance within organizations.
Environmental management is a potentially rich field for compli-
ance studies although few such studies have been conducted.35 Such
studies might focus on the consistency with which a subordinate
agency implements environmental management policies of a legisla-
tive body or an implementing agency follows its own substantive or
procedural guidelines in its individual regulatory or allocative deci-
sions. The principal evaluative criterion in such studies is adminis-
trative consistency. The principal criticism of this approach is that
too little attention is given to the impact of the policies or guidelines
on those whose behavior is regulated.
SEARCH ON DEVELOPMENTAL CONTROLS AND HOUSING COSTS (1974); C. FIELD & S.
RIVKIN. THE BUILDING CODE BURDEN (1975); D. RICHARDSON, THE COST OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION (1976); L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND Hous-
ING COSTS (1973); S. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
(1978).
32. COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW 10 (S. Krislov, K. Boyum, J. Clark, R. Shaefer, S.
White eds. 1966).
33. See T. BECKER, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL
STUDIES (1969); W. MUIR, PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967); Birkay, The Supreme
Court and the Bible Bel: Tennessee Reaction to the Schemp Decision, 10 MIDWEST J.
OF POLITICAL SCi. 304 (1966).
34. See H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1956); Litwak & Meyer, A Balance Theory
of Coordination Between Bureaucratic Organization and Community Primary Groups,
II AD. ScI. Q. 31 (1966).
35. For one such study, see Bryden, The Impact of Variances: A Study of State-
wide Zoning, 61 MINN. L. REV. 769 (1977).
19801
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The study of the actual impacts of state land use programs is an
important evaluative enterprise. Because state land use programs
differ so widely, however, the analysis of program impacts does not
lend itself well to comparative evaluation. Tracing the consequences
of a wide range of permit decisions in a particular state would make
for an extremely valuable case study. Although direct and immediate
generalizations to other states would be of dubious validity, the in-
sights gained from such studies could at least serve as credible hy-
potheses to be tested in other states.
Although states vary widely with regard to what the state controls,
it is possible to evaluate states in terms of how rigorously land use
and environmental regulatory programs are enjoined. Whether state
land use regulatory programs involve comprehensive state controls,3
6
special purpose state permits, 37 shared state-local authority over cer-
tain resources or classes of uses,38 mandatory local planning with
state review 39 or any other regulatory model, all such programs can
be evaluated in terms of how regulatory decisions are made. Specifi-
cally, one can ask:
*To what extent are state land use regulatory decisions consis-
tent with local preferences?
*To what extent are regulatory decisions consistent with the rec-
ommendations of the professional staff?
*Are decisions on permits, approval of local plans or appeals of
local decisions consistent with the legislative goals or other pol-
icy objectives of the regulatory program?
*If not, with what goals or policies are they consistent (i.e., what
is the manifest regulatory policy)?
*Is compliance with program goals changing over time? If so,
how?
*What are the characteristics of permit applications the deci-
sions on which depart substantially from legislated goals or en-
gender conflicts with local authorities or the professional stall?
Although this emphasis is not evaluative in the sense of referring to
the achievement of program goals, it makes it possible to establish
some inferences about the "success" of state land use regulatory pro-
grams. The answers to these and other questions can also be useful
36. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 (1973 and Supp. 1979).
37. See notes 2-4 supra.
38. See, e.g., Coastal Area Management Act of 1974, N.C. GEN. STAT. § I13A-
100 to 113A-128 (1975).
39. See note 7 supra.
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in guiding further inquiry into the appropriateness of the policy base
upon which decisions are made, the effect of particular decision-mak-
ing arrangements on state-local relations, the impact of special inter-
est groups on regulatory decisions, and related questions. The
compliance questions above are the basis for the evaluative case
study of Hawaii's State Land Use Law4" that follows.
III. A CASE STUDY: HAWAII
The introduction of state land use control in Hawaii was not revo-
lutionary. State control has been viewed as a response to conditions
unique to the fiftieth state: a relatively small land mass, concentrated
ownership of land, and a history of centralized government.4
Hawaii has a land area of just over four million acres, most of
which is distributed among six major islands. More than five hun-
dred thousand acres are mountainous or barren, unsuitable for devel-
opment or agriculture. Another million and a half acres are in forest
reserves, national parks, military or other uses which remove them
from potential urban use.42
Land ownership is highly concentrated. The federal government
controls nine percent of the land in the state; thirty-nine percent is
controlled by the state government and about forty-five percent is in
the hands of major private owners.43
Hawaii's Land Use Law, originally enacted in 1961," has since
been amended several times.45 The law's goals, as stated in its pre-
amble, are to protect the state's dwindling supply of prime agricul-
40 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205 (1976).
41 See Lowry & McElroy, State Land Use Control: Some Lessons from Experi-
ence. I STATE PLAN. ISSUES 1 (1977).
42 DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ECONOMic DEVELOPMENT, STATE OF HA-
WAli DATA BOOK, 97 (1977).
43 Id, at 102.
44 HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205 (1976) (originally enacted in 1961 Hawaii Sess.
Laws Act 187).
45 Id. 1963 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 205 (clarified provisions of 1961 Hawaii Sess.
Laws Act 187); 1970 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 136 (amending HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 205-6. added Part II Shoreline Setbacks); 1972 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 187 (amend-
ing HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4); 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 193 (amending HAWAII
Ri-v STAT. §§ 205-1, 205-2, 205-3. 205-4, 205-7; repealed 205-9, 205-10, 205-11; ad-
ded 205-16.1 interim statewide land use guidance policy); 1977 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act
140 (amending HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-2, 205-5); 1977 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 163
(amending § 205-2); 1978 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 166 (amending § 205-6).
1980)
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tural land and prevent scattered urban subdivisions. 6 To achieve
these purposes the law set forth a system of controls and incentives.
The law contained differential tax assessment provisions47 making it
possible for agricultural interests to dedicate their land to agricultural
uses and consequently to receive tax breaks. Before the 1973 amend-
ments, only about 60,000 acres had been dedicated, but an additional
361,000 acres were dedicated after the amendments.4 8
The regulatory aspects of the law have received the most atten-
tion.4 9 The law originally mandated placing all state lands in one of
three districts: urban, conservation, and agriculture." A fourth dis-
trict, rural, was added by amendment in 196351 to make possible low
density development on the counties of Hawaii, Kauai, and Maui.
The law established a nine-member State Land Use Commission to
allocate lands among districts, to approve or deny amendments to
district boundaries, and to rule on special permits. 2 The Land Use
Law5 3 broadly defines state land use districts and administrative au-
thority for determining permitted uses.54 Districts and permitted uses
are defined as follows:
Conservative districts include all lands within forest and watershed
zones as of 1961, although the Land Use Commission may reclassify
such lands. Areas necessary for protecting watersheds, scenic and
historic areas, parklands, wilderness, beach, open space or recreation
areas are also to be included within this district. 55
46. 1961 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 187 (finding and declaration of purpose).
47. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-12 (1976).
48. Strong, Deferred Taxation-Long Rollback: Hawaii, in UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE (1976).
49. See generally F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN
LAND USE CONTROL (1976); D. MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CON-
TROL LEGISLATION (1976); P. MEYERS, SLOW START IN PARADISE (1974); Lowry &
McElroy, State Land Use Control Some Lessons from Experience, in STATE PLAN.
ISSUES (1977).
50. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-2 (1976).
51. Id.
52. Under the original legislation the directors of the Department of Planning and
Economic Development and the Department of Land and Natural Resources served
as ex officio voting members. Amendments enacted in 1976 require that one member
be appointed from each of the counties and the remainder appointed at large. Six
affirmative votes are required for a boundary amendment. Id. § 205-1.
53. Id. § 205-2.
54. Id.
55. Id.
(Vol. 18:85
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Agricultural districts include uses characterized by the cultivation
of crops, orchards, forage and forestry, as well as such ancillary uses
as worker housing and processing mills.56 Minimum lot size in agri-
cultural districts is one acre, although each county may adopt larger
lot standards."
Rural districts include small farms with very low density residential
lots. A minimum lot size of one-half acre (substantial by Hawaii's
standards) is required in rural districts.58
Urban districts include activities or uses permitted by ordinance or
regulation of each county.59
Since 1964, the Commission's primary objective has been to allo-
cate land use in the state by ruling on proposed changes in district
boundaries. Boundary changes occur in one of two ways. A govern-
ment agency, landowner, lessee, or the Commission itself petitions
for a change under the first method. After two hearings and a recom-
mendation from the county in which the subject land unit is located,
the Commission rules, approving the petition either wholly or in part
or denying it.' Under the 1961 law, the Commission was also re-
quired to conduct a statewide boundary review every fifth year, revis-
ing district boundaries as it deemed appropriate. The comprehensive
boundary review procedure was repealed in 1975.61
In its conception, Hawaii's Land Use Law closely relates to zoning.
That is to say, the Land Use Law sets up four broad "use" categories
of land by describing each district in terms of the uses allowed
therein. Beyond this rather superficial similarity, however, the Land
Use Law barely resembles the modern local zoning ordinance. Ap-
proval of a land use district boundary change by the Commission
56. Id,
57. Id. § 205-5.
58. Id. § 205-2.
59 id.
60. d. § 205-4.
61 Act 193, Hawaii Sess. Laws (1975). Ironically, the five-year boundary review
was originally viewed as the primary means of amending district boundaries. Thus,
petitions filed between reviews were referred to as "interim" petitions. Increasingly,
however, developers chose to submit "interim" petitions rather than take their
chances in the more comprehensive periodic review of district boundaries. By drop-
ping the more comprehensive approach to land use regulation inherent in the five-
year boundary review procedure the legislature has provided explicit recognition to
the ad hoc approach currently favored by developers.
19801
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does not confer development permission upon the petitioner,62 nor
does approval necessarily imply the future density or quality of the
development. Counties exercise the full panoply of land use controls
in the urban district.63
The Land Use Law gives the State Land Use Commission a larger
direct role in allocating land among alternative uses than is available
to any other American state. The Land Use Law gives the Land Use
Commission primary responsibility for what Professor Daniel
Mandelker suggests is the most fundamental planning decision made
regarding new urban growth, namely the determination of the spatial
limit of growth, in terms of quantity and location.64 The determina-
tion of how much growth is to be allowed is critical. If the bounda-
ries are too loosely drawn the result may be an irregular,
discontinuous pattern of growth. Such a pattern of growth can result
in much higher costs for public services and facilities, such as roads
and sewers. Tightly drawn boundaries, on the other hand, increase
the competition for development approvals and increase land costs as
developers compete for developable land units.
The second major category of planning decisions delegated to the
Commission involves the determination of where new development is
to occur. Should Honolulu be allowed to encroach on prime agricul-
tural land? Will more urban expansion occur in Windward Oahu
where small farms and low density development are now prevalent?
Decisions about the location of urban expansion have critical impli-
cations for the direct public costs of growth; the provision of water,
roads, sewers and schools. They also have important social implica-
tions. A tight urban-limits policy where growth is allowed to occur
only in carefully selected locations lessens the public costs of devel-
opment and protects certain existing land uses such as plantation ag-
riculture or small farms, but could easily result in increased housing
costs if too tightly drawn.
In making these decisions about where and how much land is to be
added to the urban district, then, the Land Use Commission makes
important trade-offs. The Commission has been delegated the re-
sponsibility for determining which land uses are more socially valua-
ble. In changing the district designation of agricultural land to urban
district designation, for example, the Commission is in effect making
62. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-6 (1976).
63. Id. § 46-4.
64. D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEMMA 36-44 (1971).
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a policy decision that the urban use of that land is more valuable to
the community than the agricultural use of that same land or, at least
that the political costs of denying a more intensive use are greater
than the benefits that would flow from such an action.
From a planning perspective, then, the primary impacts of the
Commission are on the location of urban development, the amount
of land designated for urban development, the trade-offs between ur-
ban and other uses, particularly agriculture, and the protection of en-
vironmentally fragile areas from uses that would degrade or deplete
the land. Each of these potential impacts has secondary and tertiary
effects on the cost of public services, potential agricultural revenues,
open space amounts, scenic values and environmental degradation.
From a political perspective the issues include an analysis of those
served by particular allocative patterns; whether or not the allocation
is consistent with some standard of equity; and what the ideology is
which rationalizes a particular pattern of allocation. Prior to the
1975 amendments (discussed below), no explicit legislative policy ex-
isted beyond the broad goals stated in the law's preamble. Hence, the
Commission made state land use policy when ruling on individual
petitions. This is, of course, not new, either in land use control or in
many areas in which governmental control is exercised in America.
Regulation is usually, in practice, allocation; a process of distributing
benefits and burdens often without an explicit plan or well-developed
criteria to rationalize the process.65
The process of allocation has special meaning in Hawaii. Because
the land ownership is so concentrated, the Commission in effect regu-
lates competition among a relatively small number of landowners.
Secondly, there is some evidence that the Conservation, Agriculture
and Rural districts serve as holding zones in which some land units,
particularly large ones, are taxed at relatively lower rates.66 A Com-
mission decision to place such land in an urban district therefore
often confers large financial benefits upon the landowners. The
financial advantages of this arrangement may explain why corporate
interests have never staged a major political or judicial challenge to
the Land Use Law.
Hawaii's Land Use Law supplements rather than substitutes for
65 See T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1979). See generally Reich, The Law
f, the Planned Socieft 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
66. See J. KEENE, D. BARRY, R. COUGHLIN, J. FERNAM, E. KELLY, T. PLANT, &
A STRONG, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE (1976).
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local land use development authority. The Land Use Law adds an
additional level of land use control to existing local controls. Com-
mission approval of a boundary change is merely the first step in a
maze of regulatory authority that stands between private initiation of
a development proposal and ultimate change in a land unit's use.
Once the Commission places land in the urban district, it is subject
to a broad range of county controls including the county's general
plans, the zoning and subdivision ordinances, the grading ordinances,
and building permit laws among others.6" In short, the counties exer-
cise substantial authority including the power to alter or deny private
proposals for urban development.68
The primary role exercised by the counties in public management
of land conversion is in determining how much growth is to occur at
specific sites. Zoning and subdivision ordinances regulate the
amount and distribution of growth controlling population densities.
Both these ordinances, and the building code, also affect the quality
of the development by establishing minimum aesthetic and construc-
tion standards.69
A. To TWhat Extent are State Land Use Regulatory Decisions
Consistent with Local Preferences?
In the previous section a number of evaluative questions were
raised, focusing on the compliance of a state land use regulatory au-
thority with statutory goals, administrative guidelines and the recom-
mendations of local authorities and professional staff. In examining
the implementation of Hawaii's Land Use Law, we turn first to the
question of state-local relations.
Each petition acted upon by the Land Use Commission from the
time permanent land use district boundaries were drawn until the
end of 1978 was reviewed and coded for computer analysis. Petitions
withdrawn before final Commission action were not included.7 0 Ta-
ble I summarizes Commission actions for that study period.
67. See HONOLULU, HAWAII, REV. ORDINANCES ch. 21, 22, 23 (1969).
68. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 46-4 (1976).
69. See note 67 supra.
70. Withdrawals involved about three percent of the total number of petitions.
The analysis is somewhat biased by excluding petitions that were withdrawn since
withdrawals were sometimes caused by an adverse county or staff recommendation.
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Table I
Commission Decisions on Interim Boundary Petitions
1964-1978, by Island
Island/County No. of Approved % Partial % Denied %
Petitions Approval
filed
Hawaii 111 69 62.2 15 13.5 27 24.3
Kauai 56 39 69.6 10 17.9 7 12.5
Maui 54 37 68.5 6 11.1 1I 20.4
Oahu 72 38 52.8 15 20.8 19 26.4
TOTAL 293 183 62.5% 46 15.7% 64 21.8%
Of the 293 petitions acted upon by the Commission, 286 involved
requests for more intensive land uses. Of that number, 247 petitions,
or eighty-four percent, were for urban district classification.
The law stipulates that a petition for a boundary change must be
forwarded to the county in which the land unit under petition is lo-
cated for recommendations and comments by the county council.71
Data on the consistency with which the Commission has followed
county recommendations were organized by first dividing the study
period into three periods corresponding to the tenure of the Executive
Officers of the Commission staff.72 Second, the analysis used only
those petitions for a boundary change that could have resulted in
more intensive land use. Third, the data were arranged to indicate:
1) those petitions which the Commission approved, approved in part,
or denied consistent with the county recommendation; 2) Commis-
sion decisions that would have allowed a more intensive land use
than recommended by the county (Commission permissive); and 3)
those petitions for which the county recommended a more intensive
land use than allowed by the Commission (county permissive). The
data indicating the degree of agreement between county recommen-
dations and Commission decisions are presented in Table 2.
71. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4(a) (1976).
72. Because Commission members have died, resigned or been reappointed, there
is no clear division among Commissions. To the extent that there have been water-
sheds in Commission history, those points are more likely to be reflected in a change
of the Commission's Executive Officer rather than in specific time segments. Hence,
the first period is from October 1964, until July 1966. The second period is from
February 1976, until March 197 1, the third period extends until October 1975, and the
fourth period extends from that time until December 1978.
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Table 2
Degree of County-Commission Agreement on Petitions
for More Intensive Land Uses, 1964-1978, by Time Period
Period No. County/Commission S Commission % County '
filed Agreement Permissive Permissive
'64-'66 46 30 65 2 4 14 30
'66-'71 124 90 73 6 5 28 23
'71-'75 80 61 76 8 10 11 16
'75-'78 36 25 69 8 22 3 8
TOTAL 286 206 72% 24 8% 56 20%
As the data in Table 2 indicate, Commission decisions on proposed
boundary changes were consistent with county recommendations for
nearly three out of every four petitions. The instances in which the
counties were "more permissive" has declined markedly over the
years, while the Commission has become "more permissive."
What does all this indicate about state-county relations in land use
control? Bearing in mind that state-county agreement usually means
that a petition should be approved either wholly or in part, an in-
creasingly high "degree of agreement" seems to indicate consensus
regarding the need for boundary amendments and the appropriate-
ness of the locations for more intensive land uses. There is, however,
another explanation more consistent with the history of most regula-
tory agencies. A thesis familiar to students of regulatory agencies
holds that although such agencies often begin with great regulatory
fervor, they are, in time, "captured" by the very interests they are
intended to regulate.73 Because county recommendations are made
by elected officials rather than by the local professional planning
staff, the decline in "county permissive" decisions and the increasing
agreement between Commission decisions and county recommenda-
tions can also be interpreted as evidence supporting the hypothesis
that the Commission has become more sympathetic to the same real
estate and development interests that are said to dominate local land
use regulatory decision-making.74
73. See T. Lowi, supra note 65.
74. See, Gill Says Land Use Board Development Oriented, Honolulu Advertiser,
Oct. 25, 1969 at A-4; Land Use Exec Fears Giveaway, Honolulu Advertiser, Dec. 6,
1969, at A-1.
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Although the data above suggest growing state-county consensus
on land use issues, such a conclusion is misleading. While elected
officials often support Commission decisions, the professional plan-
ning staffs of the counties have grown increasingly antagonistic
toward the Commission.75
When Hawaii's Land Use Law was enacted in 1961, county gov-
ernments appeared to have neither the will nor the means to cope
with the rapid growth that accompanied statehood.76 County plan-
ning offices were understaffed and overworked, particularly on the
Neighbor Islands. The Land Use Law bought time for all the coun-
ties. Because they had direct responsibility for exercising land use
controls only in the urban districts, the planning staffs were better
able to concentrate their energies there while the state controlled the
rest of the land.
Since the Land Use Law provides the Commission with the au-
thority to determine where urban development may occur and how
large urban land inventories are to be, the counties have been rele-
gated to a secondary role in growth management. Once land is put in
an urban district, it becomes difficult for the counties to resist grant-
ing required development approvals. Instead, their role has been one
of exercising authority over the density and quality of approved de-
velopment through zoning and subdivision ordinances.
Since the law's enactment, the role and influence of county plan-
ning has expanded. HUD 701 grants77 made possible a wide variety
of county and local plans. County planning staffs have grown in size,
in professional ability and in their desire to exercise more authority
over the disposition of lands within their jurisdiction.
The 1974 boundary review suggests the potential conflict between a
Land Use Commission and a county having substantially different
community development objectives. In 1974, the City and County of
Honolulu refused to take part in the five-year boundary review con-
75. Such opposition takes many forms. For example, a motion for a resolution
calling upon the legislature to abolish the Land Use Commission was introduced by a
county official (and former executive officer to the Commission) at the annual meet-
ing of the Hawaii Congress of Planning Officials at Kailua-Kona in September 1977.
The motion was tabled. but the point was made.
76. See Lowry & McElroy, supra note 49.
77 The General Plan revision process undertaken by the Department of General
Planning resulted in a nine-volume series entitled PLANNING FOR OAHU (1974). The
City Council adopted its own policy plan. See CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
GENERAL PLAN (1976).
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ducted by the Land Use Commission.78 The county indicated that
major studies for revision of the county general plan were nearly
completed, and that any changes in district designations should con-
form with the draft plan. The county general plan revision program
focused on housing, transportation, and community development
needs; preliminary recommendations supported intensification of de-
velopment in the already-urbanized Honolulu coastal corridor, with
"directed growth" toward a new urban concentration in the area of
central Oahu closest to existing urban centers.79 The more compact
urban pattern would be served primarily by a combined bus/train
rapid transit system now in advanced planning stages. The pattern of
low-density suburban development in less accessible areas of central
Oahu and the windward coast would be discouraged by a low-prior-
ity capital improvement program for those districts.
The Commission approved additions of 1,782 acres to Oahu's ur-
ban districts."0 While the county, holding to its earlier position,
made no recommendations on these petitions, 796 acres approved
were in areas designated for little or no growth under the preliminary
county general plan revisions.8' To be fair to the Commission, it
could have done far more to undermine Honolulu's draft general
plan revision than ultimately occurred in 1974. The Commission
turned down major development proposals for the windward coast
and central Oahu, rezoning far less acreage than had been re-
quested. 82 The county's "directed growth" strategy for a concen-
trated urban node in accessible parts of central Oahu was supported
by several major rezonings. The major "losing" development pro-
posals of 1974 will be submitted again. Commission action on these
78. See note 61 supra.
79. DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL PLANNING, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU,
PLANNING FOR OAHU: AN EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE RESIDENTIAL POLICIES
(1974).
80. LAND USE COMMISSION, STATE OF HAWAII, REPORT TO THE PEOPLE ON THE
SECOND FIVE-YEAR DISTRICT BOUNDARIES AND REGULATIONS REVIEW OF THE
STATE OF HAWAII LAND USE COMMISSION 26 (1975).
81. Id.
82. A less generous interpretation of the Commission's behavior was offered by
Robert Way, a former director of the Department of General Planning in the City
and County of Honolulu: "It drives me crazy as a planning technician. Here they go
around willy-nilly deciding how land should be used. They might as well be throwing
darts at a map saying 'the blessed shall receive.'" Way .4ssails Land Use Dec/sion,
Honolulu Sunday Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, Dec. 22, 1974 at A-I.
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petitions will be an important test of intergovernmental cooperation
on growth management for Oahu.
Oahu's general plan revision process is representative of the in-
creasing sophistication and comprehensiveness of county plans . 3
While earlier county plans for Oahu have resulted in detailed maps
of desired land uses, the general plan revision stressed the definition
of general policies and desired development patterns at the regional
scale. Thus, Honolulu seeks to institute allocation at the same scale
as that practiced by the Land Use Commission. If all the counties
move to this approach (and in so doing begin to consider the supply
of urban land as somewhat less of a "given"), opportunities for direct
state-county conflict will increase.
B. To What Extent are Regulatory Decisions Consistent with the
Recommendations of Professional Staf.
Studies of the professional staff role in regulatory decision-making
bodies suggest that full-time staffs are likely to dominate part-time
decision-makers.84 Such domination arguably is likely because of the
decision-maker's lack of expertise in the relevant policy area and be-
cause of the staffs ability to devote more time and energy to back-
ground research on the decisions they must make. Staff domination,
if it existed, would be manifest in a high degree of consistency be-
tween staff recommendations and Commission decisions. Unfortu-
nately, such a consensus might also be explained by either
Commission intimidation of staff members or by an ideology shared
by both Commissioners and staff members.
Hence, the degree of agreement between staff recommendations
and Commission decisions only becomes fully meaningful in explain-
ing staff-Commission relations if 1) it is supplemented with other
data, such as interviews, or 2) one inquires into the details of particu-
lar cases. The data on Commission-staff agreement are presented in
Table 3.
83 See Lowry & Elroy, supra note 49.
84 See A. ALTSCHULER. THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS (1965); I. SCHILLMAN,
THE LIMITS OF THE LOCAL PLANNING COMMISSION (1975).
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Table 3
Degree of Staff-Commission Agreement on Petitions
for Boundary Amendments, 1964-1978, by Time Period
Period No. Staff/Commission % Commission % Staff Percentage
Filed Agreement Permissive Permissive
1964-66 46 36 78 9 20 1 2
1966-71 124 92 72 28 21 4 3
1971-75 80 74 93 4 5 2 3
1975-78 36 24 67 10 28 2 6
TOTALS 286 226 79% 51 18% 9 3%
Source: Tabulated from Commission files.
The data in Table 3 indicate a remarkably high "degree of agree-
ment" between the staff and the Commission. The consensus is par-
ticularly high from 1971 to 1975, but drops off dramatically after
1975. After that time the role played by the Commission staff
changed. The Land Use Division of the Department of Planning and
Economic Development assumed the advocacy role previously
played by the staff. The Commission staff currently generates infor-
mation about the petition, but makes no recommendation. The data
in Table 3 for 1975-1978 represent the degree of agreement between
the Commission and the Land Use Division. While it is not possible
to infer from this data whether the staff dominates the Commission
or vice versa, there appears to be either a remarkable consensus
among staff and commissioners on both the intent of the law and its
application to particular petitions, or, at the very least, widely shared
beliefs about how the law should be implemented, irrespective of its
intent. The drop in the "degree of agreement" from 1975-1978 sug-
gests that the institutional separation of the Land Use Division from
the Commission increased the Division's willingness to view petitions
more independently.
There is some impressionistic evidence that the Commission has
dominated the staff rather than vice versa. The late 1960's and early
1970's were a particularly active time for the Commission. It was
increasingly at odds with its executive officer. One of the conflicts
concerned the proposed second phase of a development in the rich
agricultural plain in central Oahu. In 1969, Oceanic Properties, a
subsidiary of Castle and Cooke, a major landowner in the state, re-
quested urban designation for an additional 2,500 acres increment to
an existing development. In recommending denial, the Commis-
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sion's staff pointed to the developer's failure to produce proposed
low-cost housing in an already completed first phase. Of 14,265 units
developed in the first phase, only 75 could be termed "low-cost., 8 5
In assessing Oceanic's performance, the executive officer stated
that "(the petitioner) has not performed. The Land Use Commission
has been duped. They should recognize their mistake and not correct
a mistake by repeating it. They have not kept faith with the Commis-
sion and should be willing to accept the consequences." 6 Some
months later he resigned under pressure and was replaced. As Table
3 indicates, the recommendations of the subsequent executive officer
were consistent with the Commission's decisions in more than ninety
percent of the petitions.
The Land Use Commission has been attentive to the staffs recom-
mendations with regard to a large proportion of the petitions on
which they ruled. Yet there are some cases which, because of their
size, or location, or perhaps because of the pleas, promises or political
influences of the petitioner, have been approved by the Commission
over strong objections by its professional staff.
The question of whether Commission decision-making processes
are more or less political than, say, the typical zoning decision-mak-
ing process cannot be answered by focusing solely on Commission
decisions or voting patterns of the Commissioners. In any case, the
characterization of a regulatory decision as "political" may not sig-
nify anything more than the fact that the observer disagrees with the
decision.
If, however, we understand "political" decisions to mean seem-
ingly arbitrary ones, decisions that do not conform to the applicable
rules, guildelines or criteria that are intended to govern regulatory
decision-making, then it is possible to provide a perspective about the
degree to which "politics" is a part of the decision-making process by
conducting a case-by-case analysis of the extent to which decisions
conform to such guidelines.8 7 Such a perspective is offered in the
following section.
85. LAND USE COMMISSION, STATE OF HAWAII, STAFF REPORT ON MILILANI
TOWN PETITION # 69-225 (Dec. 5, 1969).
86 Id.
87 There are, of course, more refined approaches to identifying "politically sig-
nificant" petitions, such as reputational surveys and cross-checks of petitions with lists
of campaign contributors.
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C. Are Land Use District Boundaries Consistent with Statutory
Objectives?
We turn now to the question of the consistency of the Land Use
Commission's decisions with the intent of the law. To facilitate anal-
ysis, Commission history has been divided into two periods. The first
period begins in 1964 when the "permanent" Commission boundary
lines were established and includes petitions acted upon prior to the
major procedural and substantive changes in the Land Use Law en-
acted in 1975. The second period includes petitions reviewed by the
Commission after those changes were enacted.
In its original form, the Land Use Law provided little in the way of
substantive policy guidance to the Commission for ruling on specific
petitions. The "Findings and Declarations of Purpose" section of the
law suggests that the purposes of the law are to prevent "scattered
subdivisions with expensive, yet reduced public services" and "the
shifting of prime agricultural lands into non-revenue producing resi-
dential uses when other lands are available that would adequately
serve urban needs. 88
Prior to the enactment of the interim statewide land use guidance
policies in 1975,89 such detailed policy guidance as was available
could be found in the Commission's regulations.9" The Commis-
sion's State Land Use District Regulations includes a section entitled
"Standards for Determining District Boundaries."'" According to
the Regulations, these standards "shall be used in establishing the dis-
trict boundaries. They also shall be used as guides for the periodic
review of district boundaries for the granting of amendments to the
district boundaries and for other changes and amendments. 92
These standards are intended to ensure that new urban districts are
located near existing urban concentrations, in close proximity to ex-
isting facilities and services and involve land units that are environ-
mentally suited for development. Taken together the statutory
language governing changes in district boundaries and the standards
88. 1961 Hawaii Sess. Laws, Act 187. This section was repealed before the law
was codified.
89. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-16.1 (1976).
90. LAND USE COMMISSION, STATE OF HAWAII, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE AND DISTRICT REGULATIONS (1975).
91. Id.§2-2.
92. Id.§6-1.
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set forth in the regulations provide the policy base for Commission
decision-making.
While most of the guidelines are individually clear and straightfor-
ward, in application there are potential ambiguities and contradic-
tions. For example, guidelines require the Commission to ensure that
there is a "sufficient reserve" of undeveloped urban land to accom-
modate new growth. The guidelines also require the Commission to
protect prime agricultural land. While there is no necessary policy
conflict here in principle, in actual practice a petition may involve a
land unit that is both well suited for agriculture and for urban pur-
poses. When such policy conflicts occur with regard to particular pe-
titions, the Commission emphasizes one or more guidelines at the
expense of others when it chooses to approve or deny the petition in
which the conflict occurs. Such tradeoffs are, of course, characteristic
of any regulatory program. To the extent that it is possible to empiri-
cally identify a consistent pattern of tradeoffs, it is possible to speak
of Commission policy with regard to changes in the district bounda-
ries.
The empirical delineation of Commission policy is conceptually
simple. It involves trying to identify a subset of the original set of
guidelines which the Commission has consistently emphasized in its
decisions. If, for example, the Commission has been faithful to the
original goals of the land use law with regard to the preservation of
prime agricultural land and the prevention of scattered, non-contigu-
ous urban development, those guidelines having to do with location
and agricultural suitability will, other things being equal, best distin-
guish between decisions to approve a petition for urban boundary
classification and decisions to deny.
To identify Commission policy, a multi-variate statistical tech-
nique, discriminant analysis, was selected.93 While the mathematics
of the technique are complex, the findings greatly facilitate under-
93. For a discussion of discriminate analysis, see J. OVERALL & C. KLETT, AP-
PLIED MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (1970); M. TATSUOKA, MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUE FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH (1971). For a dis-
cussion of the conceptual basis for discriminant analysis, see J. NUNNALLY, PSYCHO-
METRIC THEORY (1967). For an application of discriminant analysis to dichotomous
data (such as those used in this Article) see Maxwell, Canonical Variate Analysis when
the Vanables are Dichotomous, 21 EDUC. PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 259
(1961). See generalr N. NIE C. HILL, JENKINS, K. STEMBIENER & D. BENT, STATIS-
TICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1975).
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standing the types of tradeoffs made.94 First, the technique identifies
specific guidelines to distinguish petitions that were approved, par-
tially approved and those that were denied.95 These guidelines con-
stitute Commission policy in explaining Commission decisions.
Second, the technique makes it possible to determine whether there
was more than one Commission policy at work and it indicates the
relative importance of each policy. Third, the technique makes it
possible to determine how consistently the policy (or policies) were
applied by identifying those individual decisions on petitions that can
be "explained" in terms of the policy (or policies) and those which
cannot be so explained.
Since eighty-four percent of all petitions involved requests for
changing a district classification from agriculture, conservation or ru-
ral to urban, only petitions for urban classification were analyzed.
The results of the discriminant analysis applied to all petitions for
urban district designation for the period 1964-1975 are shown in Ta-
ble 4 and explained below. Table 4
Key Commission Decision Criteria for all
Interim Petitions for Urban Districts, 1964-1974
Decision Criteria
Proximity to Employment and Commerce
Proposal is economically feasible
Satisfactory topography
Satisfactory drainage
Sufficient reserve for ten years growth
Consistent with county plan
Will not contribute to scattered urban development
Land unit is characterized by city-like concentrations of
people, structures and streets
Proximity to parks
Prime agricultural land
Suitability of soil for development
Percentage of total sum of eigenvalues accounted for by
each function
Percentage of cases correctly classified
Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients
Function Function
I II
.24 -. 28
80.2%
-. 28
.15
-. 19
.19
19.2%
94. The data for this portion of the analysis were drawn from the staff reports. If,
in the opinion of the staff, the land unit for which an amendment was requested met a
guideline "I" was coded and "0" was coded if it did not meet the guideline.
95. See note 93 supra.
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Table 4 indicates that the Commission had two policies for urban
district boundary amendments. Function I identifies the dominant
Commission policy.96 The most striking characteristic of the domi-
nant commission policy is that in spite of the express goal of the law
to protect agricultural land, agricultural suitability does not appear to
have been a major factor in Commission decision-making. This
characteristic is consistent with a review of Commission files which
indicates that more than 36,000 acres of agricultural land have been
added to the urban district since 1964, about ten percent of which was
ranked "prime" in terms of agricultural productivity. 97 In other re-
spects, however, the dominant policy is generally consistent with the
intent of the law. Several measures of the location of the proposed
additions to the urban district-proximity to employment, consis-
tency with the county plan, and the avoidance of scattered urban de-
velopment--emerged as crucial variables in the dominant policy.
Two measures of the environmental suitability of land units-topo-
graphy and drainage-were also important.9 8
The minor policy described by function II is almost the opposite of
the major policy. Again, criteria having to do with the location of
new urban development are important as are criteria related to the
environmental suitability of the land units. The coefficients are nega-
tive in this function, indicating that they are describing land units not
characterized by these attributes. In addition, some of the land units
96 The discriminant technique calculates two measures for judging the relative
importance of each discriminant function. One of these is the relative percentage of
the eigenvalue associated with the function. The eigenvalue is a special measure com-
puted in the process of deriving the discriminant function. The sum of the
eigenvalues is a measure of the total variance existing in the discriminating variables.
When a single eigenvalue is expressed as a percentage of the total sum of eigenvalues,
we have an easy reference to the relative importance of the associated function. Here
the first function accounts for 80.2% of the total sum of the eigenvalues. See N. Nm,
iupra note 93. at 442.
97 These figures were computed from petitions in the Commission's files.
98 The standardized discriminant function coefficients, which are analagous to
beta weights in multiple regression, indicate the relative contribution of the decision
criteria to each function. The larger the coefficient the greater its significance in dis-
criminating among petitions that were approved, partially approved, and denied. In
this instance, the proximity of a land unit under petition to "centers of employment
and commerce" (.24) and "consistency with county general plan" (.23) emerged as
dominant explanatory variables.
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described by this function were highly productive agricultural units
as indicated by the negative value of that criterion.
Four criteria had positive coefficients on this second function. The
largest coefficient was the "sufficient reserve" criterion which, as in-
terpreted and applied by the Commission, indicates that the justifica-
tion for approving the petitions described by this function was to
ensure an adequate supply of land for new development. Petitions
described by this function were also characterized by stable soil types
that make them suitable for development. The criterion involving
the proximity of the land units to parks was also positively associated
with this function. Since park dedication by the developer is some-
times promised by petitioners seeking a change, this criterion may
mean that this function describes petitions involving large land units.
How is this "minor" Commission policy, which represents an al-
most total rejection of both the major policy and the official goals of
the law, to be interpreted? Further analysis indicates that function II
describes a policy applied only to a small subset of petitions before
the Commission.99 These petitions were partially approved by the
Commission. Generally, such partial approvals occurred when dis-
trict boundary amendments were requested for land units involving
several hundred acres. The Commission would approve only a por-
tion of the amount requested.
D. How are Decisions Inconsistent with Commission Policies to be
Interpreted?
In the analysis of Commission policy in the first study period, two
policies were identified which explain seventy percent of the Com-
mission's decisions. What of the other thirty percent of the petitions?
How are these decisions to be interpreted?
The discriminant analysis not only identifies Commission "policy"
by revealing which guidelines best distinguish between those peti-
tions approved either wholly or in part and those that were denied,
but it also classifies individual petitions according to the degree to
which they are consistent with empirically derived Commission poli-
99. This interpretation is based on inspection of the means for each of three
groups-approval, partial approval and denial-on each of the functions. Comparing
the group means on each function indicates how far the groups are along that dimen-
sion. Partial approvals had a group mean of .33 on Function II, while approvals had
a group mean of .07 and a denials group mean of 11.
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cies. " The discriminant technique presents a theoretical decision on
each petition before the Land Use Commission. These theoretical
decisions can then be compared to actual Commission decisions,
making it possible to identify each of the petitions not conforming to
the dominant Commission policy. Figure 1 compares actual Com-
mission decisions with those predicted by the two discriminant func-
tions. Those decisions in which the theoretical decision is the same as
the actual decision are located in the cells in the main diagonal ex-
tending from the lower left to the upper right. The 152 petitions in
the cells on that diagonal represent seventy percent of the total of 218
petitions.
Figure 1
Theoretical Decisions Compared with
Actual Commission Decisions
Theoretical Design
Partial
Denial Approval Approval
Approval
Actual Partial
Decision Approval
Denial
13 18 98
6 23 14
31 11 7
50 52 119 218
The empirical delineation of Commission policy provides a valua-
ble global perspective on the bases for Commission decision-making
100. The classification problem involves determining which group each petition
"resembles" the most in terms of the variables identified as constituting Commission
policy. The "typical" classificatory problem to which discriminant analysis is applied
involves determining a set of characteristics that differentiates among a particular set
of well-defined groups and then assigning an individual whose group membership is
unknown to one of the groups on the basis of his individual characteristics. For ex-
ample, job placement in a large organization might be aided by matching an individ-
ual's placement test scores (characteristics) to the job profiles until the best "fit"
between the individual's profile and a particular job profile is obtained. The particu-
lar discriminant program being used in this analysis computes two classification
measures: chi-square and posterior probability. The chi-square is a measure of dis-
tance or dissimilarity. The higher the chi-square value of a particular petition, the
farther away is the point representing the score of an individual petition from the
centroid of that group. Conversely, the lower the chi-square value, the closer the
petition is to the "average" petition in that group. The second classification measure
is the posterior probability of group membership. The posterior probability is the
probability that a particular petition, X, belongs to a particular group, Hk. Both the
chi-square and posterior probabihty result in the same classification.
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in the first period. In this section the focus is on individual petitions
which cannot be explained with reference to that policy; that is to say,
those petitions in the cells above and below the main diagonal in
Figure 1 above. While it is not possible to account for all the factors
that motivated Commissioners to react positively or negatively to
particular petitions, it may be possible to identify some of the sub-
stantive bases for departing from the primary Commission policy.
The first set of petitions to be examined involves those petitions in
which the "theoretical" decisions would have allowed for more inten-
sive land uses than actually allowed by the Commission. There are
three subsets of petitions to be examined under the heading of "per-
missive misclassifications:" 1) those petitions statistically classified
as approval but actually denied by the Commission; 2) those peti-
tions classified partial approval but actually denied by the Commis-
sion; and 3) those petitions classified approval but partially approved
by the Commission.
Detailed analysis of the individual misclassified petitions in the
three cells revealed some interesting similarities. All but one of the
six petitions denied by the Commission but classified approval were
located on the island of Hawaii. All the petitions involved relatively
small agricultural parcels adjacent to or in close proximity to urban
areas. In each case the land unit was served by facilities and services
and consistent with the county general plan.
The denial by the Commission of these six petitions points to one
of the sources of tension between the state and the counties in land
use planning matters. Each of these petitions was consistent with the
county's general plan and each was recommended for approval by
the county. Each met most of the relevant standards for an urban
district. And yet, the Commission's denials were not wholly capri-
cious: the failure of a petitioner to develop a previously re-districted
parcel, the failure to establish the need for additional urban land; or a
petitioner's unwillingness to submit a development plan for a land
unit each represent a legitimate basis to deny a petitioner. On the
other hand, the denial of these six petitions does justify a charge of
inconsistency on the part of the Commission. As subsequent analysis
indicates, the Commission has approved petitions involving several
similar land units.
Ten of the eleven petitions denied by the Commission but classi-
fied as partial approval involved land units located on Oahu. Seven
of the eleven petitions involved land units in the conservation district.
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These land units are, for the most part, adjacent to urban districts
and in close proximity to urban services. They met all or most of the
standards governing urban designation except those relating to to-
pography. Several of these land units included steeply sloped land
which, if graded and developed, would have increased the
probability of flooding and slides.
These classifications are, in part, an artifact of the discriminant
technique. The application of the technique to all petitions for urban
designation in the 1964-1975 period revealed an overall Commission
policy for deciding on petitions in that period. The petitions under
examination represent a subset of petitions to which that policy does
not apply. These petitions were classified partial approval on the
strength of the second discriminant function, which, it should be re-
called, was a secondary Commission policy of approving in part peti-
tions for large land units or petitions involving environmentally
fragile land units, some portion of which might be suitable for devel-
opment.
Of the fourteen petitions classified approved, but actually only par-
tially approved by the Commission, eleven involved land units on the
neighbor islands (i.e. islands other than Oahu). Each land unit met
the tests for urban district classification usually applied by the Com-
mission (as revealed by the discriminant analysis). In eleven of the
fourteen petitions, the Commission staff recommended partial ap-
proval and the Commission followed the staff recommendation. In
each instance, the Commission appears to have used the partial ap-
proval decisions to maintain some control over the supply of urban
land available for urbanization, as well as the pace and character of
development.
Partial approvals constitute the most interesting, and perhaps the
most important, class of decisions made by the Land Use Commis-
sion. By definition a partial approval decision is somewhere between
a decision to approve and a decision to deny a district designation
change of a land unit. In distinguishing between partial approvals
and denials on the one hand, and partial approvals and approvals on
the other, the Commission has exercised a great deal of discretion.
The proportion of misclassifications involving partial approval is
much higher than that involving other types of decisions. The overall
Commission policy described in the previous section cannot ade-
quately explain the circumstances surrounding this class of decisions.
What gives this class of decisions special importance in under-
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standing the role of the Commission in land use guidance is the foot-
in-the-door character of these decisions. Partial approvals represent
several special classes of approval. A partial approval can be a tenta-
tive "green light" to further urban development in a particular area,
signaling some urbanization is likely to take place. It may create
pressures on the petitioner to develop the initially approved portion
in a way that is likely to gain favor with the Commission so as to
allow total development of the land unit at some future time. A par-
tial approval, like an approval, may also create development pres-
sures on adjacent landowners whose taxes may increase as urban
development moves toward this land unit.
The second major subset of petitions unexplained by the Commis-
sion policy are those in which the theoretical decision was more re-
strictive than the actual decision reached by the Commission. This
subset includes the following: 1) petitions approved by the Commis-
sion but classified partial approval; 2) petitions partially approved,
but classified denial; and 3) those petitions approved by the Commis-
sion but classified denial.
As Figure 1 indicates, the Commission approved eighteen petitions
although they were classified partial approval according to the global
Commission policy. Twelve of the eighteen petitions involved
changes not in compliance with the county general plan. Nine of the
twelve petitions involving land units on Oahu led to land use classifi-
cations inconsistent with Oahu's general plan. Four of the petitions
involved land units, some portion of which had steep topography.
Two of the petitions involved land units with a high agricultural pro-
ductivity. In short, most of the petitions in this subset did not meet
one of the "critical" standards and therefore received a more restric-
tive classification than that granted by the Commission.
The Commission's use of "partial approvals" to control the supply
of urban land and the timing of development was discussed in the
previous section. In those petitions, there was a high degree of agree-
ment between the Commission staff and the Commission regarding
how much land should be redistricted.
The six petitions partially approved by the Commission but classi-
fied denial represent a different use of the partial approval technique
by the Commission. The Commission staff and the Commission dis-
agreed on each of the six petitions. Three of the six petitions ap-
peared to directly contravene the purposes of the Land Use Law.
And three petitions involved large undeveloped and unimproved
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land units in areas in which the staff held that there was already a
"sufficient reserve" of undeveloped urban land. These decisions to
partially approve petitions appear to be attempts to strike a compro-
mise between the dictates of the law (as represented by the staff) and
the preferences of politically powerful development interests.
Finally, thirteen petitions were classified denial but were approved
by the Commission. None of the thirteen petitions met the "sufficient
reserve" standard. In the judgment of the staff, approval of each of
these petitions would result in more urban land than required to meet
anticipated population growth over the next ten years.
Approval of nine of the thirteen petitions resulted in a land use
designation inconsistent with the county's general plan. Three of the
petitions involved land units on the island of Hawaii that the staff
stated would result in scattered urban development, if approved.
Four petitions involved land units with steep slopes and possible
drainage or flooding problems. A number of the other petitions also
involved land units lacking basic services and facilities such as water,
roads, sewers and the like.
E. 1975 Procedural Revisions in the Land Use Law
As noted above, the 1975 legislature made significant changes both
in Commission procedures and in the policy guidelines governing
Commission decisions.'' A 1974 ruling of the Hawaii Supreme
Court'0 2 dictated reforms in Commission procedures. The court held
that the Commission was bound by the contested case procedures for
adjudicatory proceedings as contained in the state Administrative
Procedures Act.'0 3 One of the most controversial of the new proce-
dures related to participation in Commission hearings on boundary
amendments. Under the amended procedures, full participation in
boundary amendment proceedings is limited to "parties."'' " The pe-
titioner, the Department of Planning and Economic Development,
and the Planning Department of the county in which the land unit
under petition is situated are automatic parties. Standing may also
be granted to "all departments and agencies of the state and of the
county in which the land is situated. . . upon timely application for
101. Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 205-1-205-37 (1976). For a statement of purpose, see
1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws, Act 113, § 1.
102. Town v. Land Use Comm'n, 55 Hawaii 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974).
103. HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 91-1(5) to 91-9 (1976).
104. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 205-4(e) (1976).
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intervention."' 5 Standing is also granted to persons with a property
interest in the land as well as to those who reside on it or who can
demonstrate that they will be directly affected by the proposed
change.10 6 Others are granted standing at the discretion of the Com-
mission.
Because all such parties have an opportunity to present evidence,
to call witnesses, and to rebut the testimony of witnesses, the new
Commission procedures were viewed by environmental activists,
community groups, and development interests with a mixture of con-
cern and enthusiasm. While the conference committee called the
standing provisons "extremely liberal,"' 7 other legislative partici-
pants thought the effect of these provisions might be to restrict partic-
ipation. 10
8
Allowing individuals, community groups and special interest
groups to have formal standing before the Commission provides an-
other set of recommendations to the Commission. These recommen-
dations do not constrain the Commission in its decision-making any
more than do the recommendations of County Council or the Com-
mission's staff (or the Land Use Division since 1965).109 To the ex-
tent that recommendations by parties are unanimous, however, it is
possible to assess the extent to which the Commission has been re-
sponsive to those recommendations.
Of the thirty-six petitions ruled on by the Commission since these
procedural changes were enacted in 1975, there were only seven in-
stances in which parties other than the petitioner, the Department of
Planning and Economic Development and the County Planning De-
partment, all of whom are parties on every case, petitioned for stand-
ing. Of that number, the parties, which included state agencies,
individuals, community groups and special interest groups, were gen-
erally opposed to six petitions, although often in different degrees
and for different reasons." 0 Table 5 indicates the degree of agree-
105. Id. § 205-4(e)(2).
106. Id. § 205-4(e)(3).
107. CONFERENCE REP. No. 25, Hawaii State Legislature (1975).
108. Honolulu Advertiser, April 12, 1975, § A, at 3.
109. However, "[fif any party to a proceeding has filed proposed findings of fact,
the Commission shall incorporate in its decision a ruling upon each proposed finding
so presented." HAWAII STATE LAND USE COMMISSION, RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, Pt. 4, at 3 (1975).
110. One petition involving the downzoning of portions of a marsh located in
windward Oahu was dropped from the analysis because the parties were divided in
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ment between recommendations by parties and Commission action.
Table 5
Degree of Party-Commission Agreement on Petitions
for Boundary Amendments, 1975-1978"
Party/Commission Commission Party
Agreement % Permissive % Permissive %
2 33 4 67 0 0
* Using only those six petitions upon which there was general agreement by parties.
The recommendations of the parties were consistent with those of
the Land Use Division of the Department of Planning and Economic
Development on each of the six petitions. Hence, while the Commis-
sion has not used the new procedures to restrict access to Commission
proceedings neither have they been particularly responsive to the
views and recommendations introduced by other parties.
F. 1975 Substantive Revisions in the Land Use Law
The 1975 legislature was also very concerned with the substantive
policy basis for Commission decisions. The conference committee
noted
that there is an urgent need for substantive State land use poli-
cies to guide and govern the Land Use Commission in determin-
ing land use district boundaries. The standards of Hawaii's
existing Land Use Law, although laudable, lack sufficient speci-
ficity to guide the Commission in the exercise of its very impor-
tant functions." 1
The legislature inserted the following test:
No amendment of a land use district boundary shall be ap-
proved unless the Commission finds upon the clear preponder-
ance of the evidence that the proposed boundary is reasonable,
not violative. . . [of the statutory definition of the uses and ac-
tivities allowed in land use districts] and consistent with the in-
their views. The redesignation of the marsh, which had been proposed by the Depart-
ment of Planning and Economic Development, was denied by the Commission. The
other six petitions and their docket numbers are: Kula Aii, 75-405; Edwin Kam, 76-
416 Mililani Town, Inc., 76-427; Windward Partners, 76-423; West Beach, 76-421;
Clinton Shiraishi, 76-422.
11. CONFERENCE REP. No. 25, Hawaii State Legislature (1975).
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terim policies and criteria established. . .[by the legislature] or
any state plan enacted by the legislature which plan shall super-
sede any interim guidance policies.
12
Pending the development of a state plan, the legislature specified
eight "interim" policies to be observed by the Commisson "except
when the Commission finds that an injustice or inequity will re-
sult." ' 3 Five of the interim guidance policies emphasize containing
urban sprawl. One of the original purposes of the Land Use Law, the
preservation of prime agricultural land in agricultural use, receives
only passing mention." 4
Final decisions were made on twenty-eight petitions for urban dis-
trict designation from the time the interim statewide land use gui-
dance policies were enacted in 1975 until December 1978. The
results of the discriminant analysis of these twenty-eight petitions are
shown in Table 6.
112. HAWAII REv. STAT. § 205-4(h) (1976).
113. Id. § 205-16.1. The interim policies are:
(1) Land use amendments shall be approved only as reasonably necessary to
accommodate growth and development, provided there are no significant adverse
effects upon agricultural, natural, environmental, recreational, scenic, historic, or
other resources of the area.
(2) Lands to be reclassified as an urban district shall have adequate public
services and facilities or as can be so provided at reasonable costs to the peti-
tioner.
(3) Maximum use shall be made of existing services and facilities, and scat-
tered urban development shall be avoided.
(4) Urban districts shall be continguous to an existing urban district or shall
constitute all or a part of a self-contained urban center.
(5) Preference shall be given to amendment petitions which will provide per-
manent employment, or needed housing accessible to existing or proposed em-
ployment centers, or assist in providing a balanced housing supply for all
economic and social groups.
(6) In establishing the boundaries of the districts in each county, the Com-
mission shall give consideration to the general plan of the county.
(7) Insofar as practicable conservation lands shall not be reclassified as urban
lands.
(8) The Commission is encouraged to reclassify urban lands which are in-
compatible with the interim statewide land use guidance policy or are not devel-
oped in a timely manner.
114. Id. §205-16.1(1).
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Table 6
Key Commission Decision Criteria for All
Interim Petitions for Urban Districts, 1975-1978
Decision Criteria Standardized Discriminant
Function Coefficients
I II
Land unit is characterized by city-like concentrations of
people, structures, and streets -0. 0.81
Proximity to basic services such as
Water 1.43 -0.65
Roads 0.68 -0.04
Sewers -1.62 -0.77
Consistent with county plan -0.05 1.11
Percentage of total sum of eigenvalues accounted for by
each function 73.1% 26.9%
Percentage of cases correctly classified 94%
The discriminant analysis indicates that the availability of urban
services and existing development patterns figured prominently in
Commission policy. Generally, however, the pattern is not consistent
with a strict urban containment philosophy. Had the urban contain-
ment philosophy so well expressed in the interim land use guidance
policies been followed more closely by the Commission one would
expect a stronger association among these variables having to do with
urban services (water, sewers and roads), the variable indicating ex-
isting urban attributes (city-like concentrations of people, structures
and streets) and the county general plan.
An analysis of the individual petitions suggests that the Commis-
sion was faithful to the urban containment philosophy with regard to
several petitions, but that several large land units were approved for
urban uses although they did not meet several of the urban tests,
most notably those having to do with the availability of urban serv-
ices. Two of these petitions involved land units on Oahu's central
plain. In approving these petitions, the Commission chose to empha-
size the policy having to do with providing a "balanced housing sup-
ply.""' This emphasis, it should be recalled, is consistent with
Commission policy prior to the enactment of the interim land use
guidance policies.
115. Id. § 205-16.1(5).
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G. The 1978 State Plan and the Land Use Commission
The State Plan proposed by the state administration and enacted
by the 1978 legislature" 16 provides the institutional and policy context
for Hawaii's future state growth management efforts. The legislation
mandates a "statewide planning system" which explicitly includes
state functional plans, county general plans, the state program appro-
priations process, state capital improvements appropriations, the
budgetary review process conducted by the Department of Budget
and Finance, land use regulatory decisions made by the Board of
Land and Natural Resources and the Land Use Commission and,
finally, a Policy Council.17 The "statewide planning system" can be
thought of as including a policy apparatus, a planning apparatus, an
implementation apparatus and a monitoring apparatus.
The policy context of the state plan is found in the overall theme,
goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions of the legislation., 18
These objectives and policies vary somewhat in the level of generality
in which they are expressed. Most of them, however, are not suffi-
ciently specific to provide clear guidance in regulatory decision-mak-
ing or budget allocations. The most specific policy guidance in the
legislation is found in the section on priority directions. Priority di-
rections are defined as "overall direction and implementing ac-
tions. . . .'I The legislature developed priority directions for the
economy, for population growth and distribution, and for land re-
sources. The legislature also extended the Land Use Commission's
interim guidance policies, originally scheduled for repeal upon enact-
ment of the state plan, until "two years after the effective date of the
reenactment of the state plan."'120
The planning apparatus includes state functional plans and county
general plans.' 2' Functional plans are to be based on the policies
articulated in the state plan. Additionally, "[c]ounty general plans
and development plans shall be used as a basis in the formulation of
116. Id. § 226 (Supp. 1978).
117. Id. §§ 226-52, 53.
118. Id. §§ 226-3 to 226-8, 226-101 to 226-105.
119. Id. § 226-2(7).
120. Id. § 205-16.2.
121. Id. § 226-52(3). "State functional plans shall be prepared for, but not limited
to, the areas of agriculture, conservation lands, education energy, higher education,
health, historic preservation, housing, recreation, tourism, transportation, and water
resources development." d.
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state functional plans."' 22 Likewise county general plans are to be
consistent with policies in the state plan and the "[flormation,
amendment, and implementation of county general plans or develop-
ment plans shall utilize as guidelines, statewide objective, policies,
and programs stipulated in state functional plans adopted in conso-
nance with this chapter."'123
The state plan specifically designates several mechanisms for im-
plementing the plan:
*the appropriation of funds for major programs under the bien-
nial and supplemental budgets;
*a capital improvement projects and plans;
*the budgetary review and allocation process of the Department
of Budget and Finance;
*state plans;
*decisions by the Land Use Commission; and
*decisions by the Board of Land and Natural Resources. 124
The state plan act requires that decisions and appropriations be "in
conformance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies and
priority directions" contained in the plan. 2 The act also specifies
that the appropriation of funds for capital improvements and deci-
sions by the Land Board and the Land Use Commission must be
consistent with functional plans adopted pursuant to the law. 126 In
addition, rules and regulations adopted by both the Land Board and
the Land Use Commission are to be in conformance with the Act. 127
The Hawaii state plan legislation is far-reaching both in terms of
the degree of consistency required between the law and individual
plans and programs and in terms of the sheer number of planning,
programmatic, regulatory and budgetary processes that must be coor-
dinated. Given the generality of the policy statements in the state
plan and the array of planning, budgetary and regulatory activities
that are to be coordinated, conflicts are inevitable. To deal with such
conflicts, the act mandates the formation of an eighteen-member pol-
icy council, half of whose voting members are appointed by the gov-
ernor from lists submitted by county mayors. In addition to these
122. Id. § 226-52(3).
123 Id. § 226-61(a).
124. Id. § 226-52(b)(2).
125. Id. § 226-52(a)(5).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 226-52(b)(2)(D).
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"public" representatives there are nine members who represent state
and county agencies.'12
The Policy Council is to "provide a forum for the discussion of
conflicts" and to make recommendations on all such conflicts to the
governor, the legislature, the mayors and county councils.12 9 The
council is also to review and evaluate the state's functional plans for
conformance with the plan; 30 to conduct comprehensive reviews of
the plan's policies on a periodic basis commencing in 1981;11' to
make recommendations for the legislature on the administration,
amendment and review of the plan;' 32 and to issue an annual report
assessing the progress of the plan.133
IV. CONCLUSIONS
While there is little disagreement concerning the need for evaluat-
ing state land use regulatory programs, less consensus exists as to the
appropriate evaluative approaches and methods. Among the various
approaches reviewed, the compliance approach proved fruitful be-
cause it lends itself well to comparative analysis and because it can
provide the basis for broader analysis focusing on the institutional,
political and socio-economic conditions that enhance or impede com-
pliance.
In particular, the compliance analysis of the implementation of
Hawaii's Land Use Law indicated several points of interest to those
concerned about state land use programs.
1. There was a high degree of agreement between local
(county) recommendations by elected officials for boundary
amendments and Commission decisions. This apparent con-
sensus, however, masked some genuine conflicts with local
professional planning staff.
2. The Commission's decisions were consistent with the recom-
mendations of its professional staff on a substantial propor-
tion of decisions. The Commission followed staff
recommendations closely on most routine cases, but was
more apt to depart from staff recommendations if the peti-
128. Id. § 226-53.
129. Id. § 226-54(1), (2).
130. Id. § 226-54(3).
131. Id. § 226-54(8).
132. Id. § 226-54(4).
133. Id. § 226-54(9).
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tion involved potentially large additions to the urban dis-
trict.
3. The original legislative objectives of the Land Use Law were
to preserve prime agricultural land and prevent scattered ur-
ban subdivisions. Analysis of Commission decisions indi-
cated that the preservation of agricultural land was not
emphasized in Commission decisions, although the Com-
mission was more sensitive to issues regarding the appropri-
ate location of new development, particularly where
petitions involving small land units were concerned.
4. Analysis of compliance of Commission decisions with ad-
ministrative guidelines during the period before the reform
of the law in 1975 indicated that the Commission had two
policies governing proposed additions to the urban district.
The major policy applied to the majority of the petitions
before the Commission was largely consistent with the intent
of the law, except that it did not emphasize preservation of
prime agricultural land in agricultural use. The minor pol-
icy, however, violated the intent of the law. Under this mi-
nor policy the Commission partially approved several large
proposed additions to the urban district involving agricul-
tural land. Several steeply sloped land units were also added
to the urban district under this minor policy. The minor pol-
icy applied to about seventeen percent of the petitions before
the Commission.
5. Despite the procedural and policy amendments to the Land
Use Law enacted in 1975, the same major pattern of Com-
mission decision-making prevailed in the period from 1975-
1978.
6. A Commission decision to "partially approve" some propor-
tion of a proposed addition to the urban district has been its
way of seeking a political compromise on petitions about
which there was a great deal of conflict. Historically, how-
ever, the area that is approved for addition to the urban dis-
trict subsequently becomes the rationale for further
additions to the district.
It is difficult to explain the approval or partial approval of many
petitions by reference to the formal criteria governing Commission
decision-making. How, then, are they to be explained? What "infor-
mal" criteria govern Commission decision-making?
The need for housing, or more specifically, the need for low-cost
housing, is generally cited as the primary rationale for most of the
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decisions consistent with the Commission's minor policy.' 34 The
need for low-cost housing is a constant theme echoed by almost all
developers or landowners whose land unit would not qualify for ur-
ban designation if the Commission rules and regulations were con-
sistently enforced.
On Oahu, in particular, some of the land most suitable for develop-
ment in terms of location and topography is also the most agricultur-
ally productive. Faced with what appears to be a choice between
preserving this land for agriculture and redistricting for low-cost
housing, promised by a developer, how should the Commission de-
cide? The case for development becomes more compelling when
those with the largest stakes in agriculture argue for development.
Some of the corporate managers of the agricultural interests have ar-
gued that rising labor costs, new technologies and foreign competi-
tion have made Hawaii's pineapple and sugar less competitive in a
world market.'35 The closing of several mills and processing plants
seems to have underscored their arguments. It is possible to discount
the argument of corporate managers as being somewhat self-serving
attempts to realize the greater corporate profits that can come from
land sales or a development package. When they are joined by lead-
ers of the unions that represent the agricultural workers, the case for
development becomes politically viable.
"Low-cost housing" is not the only value against which the preser-
vation of prime agricultural land has been weighed. At least two
other factors can also be cited to explain Commission departures
from their policy of maintaining loose control over the supply of ur-
ban land and its location relative to other urban areas.
134. With regard to one such decision the Commission's executive officer is
quoted as saying that "the vast plain of prime agricultural land in Central Oahu will
be sacrificed to urban use as fast as leases expire, withdrawal clauses are exercised,
development contracts are signed and bulldozers can move." On the other side, an
official of the union that represents agriculture workers and a member of the Com-
mission noted that the Commission agreed to a change in the district boundary from
agriculture to urban because there is a "desperate need for housing for plantation
workers in the Waipahu area." Waipahu Land Zonedfor Homes, Honolulu Star Bul-
letin, Sept. 13, 1969, at A-9, col. I. See Official Split on Land Use, Honolulu Adver-
tiser, Sept. 18, 1969, at A-18, col. 1.
135. The amount of land in sugar production declined from 329,800 acres in 1967
to 220,700 acres in 1977, but lands in pineapple declined from 64,000 in 1967 to
47,000 in 1977. While the number of major pineapple producers in Hawaii has
dropped dramatically, some have merely shifted their operations to Taiwan and the
Philippines. STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT, DATA BOOK 292 (1978).
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One of these important factors seems to be the scale of a proposed
development. A petition for several hundred acres-or several thou-
sand-often creates a certain dynamic in the form of high-priced law-
yers, slick brochures, feasibility studies and endorsements from
community groups and elected officials. In reviewing the Commis-
sion's decision to partially approve the original Mililani Town peti-
tion, the Commission's Executive Officer commented that "the
Commission was undoubtedly overwhelmed by the fact that $500,000
was spent in planning and economic feasibility studies, three separate
housing studies, three different architectural teams all submitting
supporting data justifying $15,000 to $20,000 housing packages."' 36
Closely related to the importance of scale in explaining otherwise
difficult-to-explain decisions is what seem to be certain value prem-
ises shared by Commissioners about the use of land. Among these
value premises that seem to guide the Commission in its decision-
making is a conception of land as primarily a commodity, an eco-
nomic resource. The Commissioners are not alone in this orientation
toward land. It is, in fact, widely shared.
It is difficult to determine whether some of those Commission deci-
sions that contravene the purposes of the Land Use Law actually rep-
resent a belief that a developer will provide low-cost housing, a
respect for large-scale investment, or a feeling that investors and
landowners are entitled to the "highest and best use" of their land so
long as those uses do not violate too many public purposes. It is,
however, possible to construct a plausible ideology to account for
what otherwise appear as aberrations in Commission decision-mak-
ing, to impute this ideology to the various Commissioners and,
thereby explain all the Commission's decisions in a large but tidy
package.
Ideology is, of course, just one of several possible lines of inquiry
to explain the seemingly inexplicable. One of the arguments to ex-
plain Commission decisions with which one disagrees is to suggest
that they represent "political payoffs." Historically, the zoning pro-
cess in America has been rife with subtle and less-than-subtle forms
of influence peddling. There is no reason to think that Commission-
ers in Hawaii have been wholly immune to the pressure of powerful
political forces or to the favors that a beneficial land use decision can
bring.
1 37
136. See note 85 supra.
137. One prominent example involved charges made by two community groups
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Several of the petitions which violate the explicit purposes of the
Land Use Law involved state legislators or county councilmen either
as owners or as lawyers for the landowners or developers. 38 Other
favored petitioners have been prominent financial backers of one fac-
tion of the Democratic Party.'39 Finally, two Commissioners were
themselves active in re-districting land in which they had a financial
interest. 140
Several observers of the Commission have used these examples to
serve as a basis for inferences about the processes which led to a
wider range of Commission decisions. Charges of political favoritism
or corruption are often advanced as convenient explanations for land
use decisions that are difficult to explain with reference to the stan-
dards that are supposed to govern such decisions. The process of
gaining a favorable Commission decision is, however, often more
subtle and complex, involving elements of merit, shared ideology,
and cronyism. Such a process is more difficult to evaluate by the
sorts of "objective standards" of which ethics laws are constructed.
Whatever the explanation for Commission decisions in contraven-
tion of the Land Use Law's intent, it is important for policy makers
and program administrators to determine the implications for state
land use control elsewhere. One perspective is that the sort of broad
discretion exercised by Hawaii's Land Use Commission in the inter-
pretation and application of legislative mandates and/or administra-
tive guidelines to particular petitions is one of the political costs of
engaging in state land use control. Tight, specific policies, it is ar-
gued, will result in the legislative death of most state programs as
on Kauai that a mainland firm approached the then chairman of the Commission
about how to expedite its petition. The chairman was alleged to have recommended a
particular lawyer and suggested that a fee of several hundred thousand dollars was
not out of line. See Land Use Manioulatdon Charged in Kauai Case, Honolulu Star
Bulletin, Oct. 4, 1974, at A-I, col. 1.
138. See, 4 Hot Argument over Bills, Honolulu Advertiser, June 20, 1969, at A-I,
col. 5. A former commissioner alleged that a legislator and former lawyer for a major
development corporation introduced legislation designed to aid the developer.
139. See, Apartment Greener than Golf Course, Honolulu Star Bulletin, Oct. 19,
1972, at A-2, col. 1. This Article recounts the successful efforts of the campaign
finance chairman of a former governor to engineer a multi-million dollar develop-
ment through the regulatory maze of two state agencies.
140. See State Land Official Voted to Rezone Own Propery, Honolulu Star Bulle-
tin, Aug. 14, 1970, at A-l, col. 3; Chairman Rezoned His Land, Honolulu Advertiser,
Aug. 20, 1970, at A-I, col. 1. See also Land Use Conflicts Held Not Criminal, Hono-
lulu Advertiser, Oct. 30, 1970, at A-12, col. 6.
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would strict enforcement of generally stated preservationist policies.
Thus, the broad discretion exercised by a regulatory body such as
Hawaii's Land Use Commission and the consequent, seemingly arbi-
trary decisions which may result from that discretion are not a "prob-
lem" but a condition inherent in regulation.
For those who regard such discretion as a problem, there may be
other, more appropriate regulatory models. Specific policies are one
solution, particularly when tied to cause of action provisions that
make it possible to sue in instances of noncompliance by an adminis-
tering body. One of the difficulties with such policies, aside from po-
tential inflexibility, is that a state generally trades comprehensiveness
for specificity. A specific set of policies which leave little room for
discretion is generally more likely to be politically and judicially via-
ble when dealing with only a few special resources (wetlands) or par-
ticular uses (power plants).
Another regulatory model of which there are several variations is
state or regional review of certain classes of decisions at the local
level (residential developments of more than a certain size), or all
local decisions in certain areas (coastal zone). Such review would
also require a specific policy base. Such a state review reduces the
potential arbitrariness of decisions at only one level of government.
The tight coordination between planning, budgetary and regula-
tory decisions inherent in Hawaii's new state plan legislation repre-
sents a third potential model for other states. These management
models and their many variations require careful evaluation.
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